Decisive Role of B-29s in Victory over Japan

“I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb. Its production and its use were not lightly undertaken by this government. But we knew that our enemies were on the search for it. We won the race of discovery against the Germans. Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans. We shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan’s power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us.”

“We had developed a weapon of such a revolutionary character that its use against the enemy might well be expected to produce exactly the kind of shocks on the Japanese ruling oligarchy which we desired, strengthening the position of those who wished peace, and weakening that of the military party….But the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon…So far as the Japanese could know, our ability to execute atomic attacks, if necessary by many planes at a time, was unlimited. As Dr. Karl Compton has said, ‘It was not one atomic bomb or two, which brought surrender; it was the experience of what an atomic bomb will actually do to a community, plus the dread of many more, that was effective.’

“The bomb thus served exactly the purpose we intended. The peace party was able to take the path of surrender, and the whole weight of the Emperor’s prestige was exerted in favor of peace….I felt that we must use the Emperor as our instrument to command and compel his people to cease fighting and subject themselves to our authority through him, and that to accomplish this we must give him and his controlling advisers a compelling reason to accede to our demands. This reason furthermore must be of such a nature that his people could understand his decision. The bomb seemed to me to furnish a unique instrument for that purpose….

“My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the armies which I had helped to raise. In the light of the alternatives which, on a fair estimate, were open to us I believe that no man, in our position and subject to our responsibilities, holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities for accomplishing this purpose and saving those lives, could have failed to use it and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face….

“The decision to use the atomic bomb was a decision that brought death to over a hundred thousand Japanese. No explanation can change that fact and I do not wish to gloss it over. But this deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies….”

“The collapse of Japan has vindicated the whole strategic concept of the offensive phase of the Pacific war. Viewed broadly and simply, that strategy was to advance air power, both land and carrier-based, to the point where the full fury of crushing air attack could be loosed on Japan itself, with the possibility that it would bring about the defeat of Japan without invasion and with the certainty that it would play an essential and vital role in preparation for and cooperation with an invasion. The entire island-hopping campaign in the southwest and central Pacific had as one of its principal objectives the acquisition of air bases ever closer to, and finally within range of, Japan….

“This, then, was how the surrender of the Japanese was brought about. I wish to stress it, because the harnessing of the atom and its dramatic use as the climax of this campaign has tended to overshadow a most important point. When the atomic bomb was ready, we were in a position to deliver it, practically unopposed, to any point in Japan that we chose. The appalling effects of the delivery are shown in the Japanese Emperor’s rescript announcing surrender: ‘Should we continue to fight, it would…result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation.’

“This is true but the Japanese situation was hopeless before that. There is reason to think that, from the Japanese standpoint, the atomic bomb was really a way out. Because the bomb was incredibly destructive, it was possible for the Emperor, without too much loss of face, to give up, as the only answer to this unheard-of development. The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell because the Japanese had lost control of their own air. They could not counter our air strikes, and so could not prevent the destruction of their cities and industries. They could not offer any effective opposition to the gathering of the immense forces of our land-sea-air team, which was preparing to descend on their coasts.”

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“Basic United States strategy contemplated that the final decision in the Japanese war would be obtained by an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The long-range bombing offensive from the Marianas was initiated in November 1944 with that in mind as the primary objective. As in Europe prior to D-day, the principal measure of success set for strategic air action was the extent to which it would weaken enemy capability and will to resist our amphibious forces at the time of landings. This led, originally, to somewhat greater emphasis on the selection of targets such as aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, and finished military goods, destruction of which could be expected to weaken the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces to resist at the Kyushu beachheads in November 1945, than on the disruption of the more basic elements of Japan’s social, economic, and political fabric.

“With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the twin objectives of surrender without invasion and reduction of Japan’s capacity and will to resist an invasion, should the first not succeed, called for basically the same type of attack. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion was the basic economic and social fabric of the country….

“The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was 656,000. Of this, 160,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home islands of Japan. Navy aircraft accounted for 6,800 tons, Army aircraft other than B-29s for 7,000 tons, and the B-29s for 147,000 tons. By contrast, the total bomb tonnage in the European theater was 2,700,000 tons of which 1,360,000 tons were dropped within Germany’s own borders….

“In the aggregate, 104,000 tons of bombs were directed at 66 urban areas; 14,150 tons were directed at aircraft factories; 10,600 tons at oil refineries; 4,708 tons at arsenals; 3,500 tons at miscellaneous industrial targets; 8,115 tons at airfields and seaplane bases in support of the Okinawa operations; and 12,054 mines were sown….

“Physical damage to plant installations by either area or precision attacks, plus decreases due to dispersal forced by the threat of further physical damage, reduced physical productive capacity by roughly the following percentages of pre-attack plant capacity: oil refineries, 83 percent; aircraft engine plants, 75 percent; airframe plants, 60 percent; electronics and communication equipment plants, 70 percent; light metal, 35 percent; ingot steel, 15 percent; chemicals, 19 percent….

“Generally speaking, the urban attacks resulted in a serious and widespread collapse in public morale which was reflected in all phases of the Japanese war economy….

“Perhaps the most significant result of the raids on the general population was the spreading of the conviction that continued resistance to the Allied strength was futile. Particularly, the extension of the bombing program to the smaller cities convinced the people that the Allied aircraft could, and would, destroy every city in Japan. Furthermore, they were made painfully aware of the impotence of their government which could no nothing to prevent the wholesale destruction, or minimize its effects….

“The physical destruction resulting from the air attack on Japan approximates that suffered by Germany, even though the tonnage of bombs dropped was far smaller. The attack was more concentrated in time, and the target areas were smaller and more vulnerable. Not only were the Japanese defenses overwhelmed, but Japan’s will and capacity for reconstruction, dispersal, and passive defense were less than Germany’s. In the aggregate some 40 percent of the built-up area of the 66 cities attacked was destroyed. Approximately 30 percent of the entire urban population of  Japan lost their homes and many of their possessions. The physical destruction of industrial plants subjected to high-explosive attacks was similarly impressive. The larger bomb loads of the B-29s permitted higher densities of bombs per acre in the plant area, and on the average somewhat heavier bombs were used. The destruction was generally more complete than in Germany….

“As in Germany, the air attacks against Japanese cities were not the cause of the enemy’s defeat. The defeat of Japan was assured before the urban attacks were launched. But this defeat, before it could be translated into the terms of surrender, might have required a costly invasion of the home islands had not the effect of the air attacks, both precision and urban, on Japan’s industries and people exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender on 15 August. The city raids contributed substantially to that pressure by their impact on the social and economic structure of Japan…

“A striking aspect of the air attack was the pervasiveness with which its impact blanketed Japan. Roughly one-quarter of all people in cities fled or were evacuated, and these evacuees, who themselves were of singularly low morale, helped spread discouragement and disaffection for the war throughout the islands. This mass migration from the cities included an estimated 6,500,000 persons. Throughout the Japanese islands, whose people had always thought themselves remote from attack, United States planes crisscrossed the skies with no effective Japanese air or antiaircraft opposition. That this was an indication of impending defeat became as obvious to the rural as to the urban population…

“Sixty-four percent of the population stated that they had reached a point prior to surrender where they felt personally unable to go on with the war…

“The Survey has estimated that the damage and casualties caused at Hiroshima by the one atomic bomb dropped from a single plane would have required 220 B-29s carrying 1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive bombs, and 500 tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, if conventional weapons, rather than an atomic bomb, had been used. One hundred and twenty-five B-29s carrying 1,200 tons of bombs would have been required to approximate the damage and casualties at Nagasaki…

“It seems clear…that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan’s surrender and obviated any need for invasion…

“Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”